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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present an original approach for modelling the cooperative infonnation
filtering problem using Logic of Infonnation Flow and Situation Theory .We describe the
fundamental concepts of these theories and discuss crucial issues that arise during the
exposition, such as defining Situation Theory as a Heyting algebra and showing that in our
application this theory is well-founded.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, although we have two original approaches -the application and the
fonnalization -we choose to focus on the latter because it may be a powerful tool for many
researchers that deal with infonnation, in our case, with cooperative infonnation filtering.
There are many infonnation filtering systems [9, 10, 11, 13] (also called recommender
systems)[12] but alI ofthem use the results ofthe filtering individually, i.e., each user uses the
results for his or her own purpose. In our system, a cooperative infonnation filtering
1 This research was partially supported by CNPq -National council for Scientific Technological
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teamwork oriented, we use the results to improve the productivity of teamwork itself.
Relevant and important infonnation that is useful for the members of the team to achieve
their common goal is shared. AlI members are aware that knowledge must be spread by all in
order to homogenize it.
Because of the complexity of this problem, we feel the necessity to fonnalize it. We tried hard
to find a tool to help us in this fonnalization and we found in Logic of Infonnation Flow and
in the Situation Theory powerful and efficient tools to do our modelling. After this, we could
focus clearly on the real problem and work for which it is hard to find a solution. During this
fonnalization, we found that many other infonnation systems could be fonnalized as well use
these models. In this paper we will give more details of the fonnalization itself and show the
potentiality of this logic.
LOGIC OF INFORMATION FLOW
The Logic of Infonnation Flow (LIF) was basically created by Jon Barwise [3, 5] based on
the Situation Theory .The fundamental interest for those that study this logic is to offer a
fonnal theory of infonnation.
The Logic of Infonnation Flow primitives are Sites and Channels: Sites are places or
situations and channels are ways that connect the sites. Here we say that S denotes a set of
sites and C denotes a set of channels. For instance, we can think of something physical where
Sites are telephones, computers or IIsites" ofthe Internet, and channels are telephone cables or
optic fibbers, coaxial cables in a computer network, etc. However, in our model, we will work
with something more abstract.
Sites and Channels as physical concepts:
Site Channel Site
Site Channel Site







In some cases, the set of channels may be included in S. This means that in this case channel
C may be a site. It occurs when we model the Classic Logic where sites and channels are the
same thing. However, in most cases, sites and channels may be disjunct sets, where S ("'\ C =
0.
Why are sites and channels the same thing in Classic Logic? If we consider those sentences,
(as in prepositional calculus) sites, -as Barwise did-, we have a set of truths called axiomas
and theorems. The latter have been proved by using inference rules. These rules are channels
because the information that is in one site is going to flow to another site, by the application
of an inference rule. However, as we can express the inference rules in the same language as
the language we use for the sites, in fact, C is identical to S.
Constraints
One of the fundamental relations between sites and channels is what we call constraint. It is
used here as something that generalizes every kind of inference rule, making it possible that
from one proposition we infer another. Constraints, in general, are regularities that, in a
general sense, taking our world as an example, make it unifonI1, by means of physical or
natural laws. Example: for alI thenI1ometers that work well, the height of the mercury will
always be the same for a certain temperature. There are kinds of constraints that are
conventions. In the Classic Logic the inference rules are the constraints.
In our case, a constraint gives the type of channel where the infonI1ation flows, i.e., it is the
filter that detenI1ines which infonI1ation will passes from one site to another. In other words, it
is the criterion that detenI1ines which kind of infonI1ation flows into the channel. These





cl : A  c
Where cl is the type of channel that carries the infonI1ation from A to C.
MODELLING THE INFORMATION FIL TERING PROBLEM
Some observations are welcome for better understanding of the modelling bellow. When we
are modelling we need to choose a way that follows our intuition, where we can see the
problem more clearly. The choice of the right primitives is essential to the success of any
fonI1alization.
  For us, sites are the set ofuser's profiles.
  By using our abstract point of view, profiles can be of an individual user or a set of users;
  The modelling is independent of the type of filter or site implemented;
0 Using the formallanguage ofthe Situation Theory, we can describe sites, i.e., people or a
set of people, as an information base or infobase.
There are two parts ofthe modelling:
O The Situation Theory where the facts are presented ;
8 The Logic of Information Flow where the most general idea of Barwise is observed. It says
that independently of the logic or theory , in the portion of the information f1ow, we always
have the sites of information and channels where this information f1ows between the sites.
In particular, we see these sites as these infobases described in the Situation Theory's
language, that is a user or a set of users ratings. In addition, we see the channels as filters.
Which is exactly the idea of Barwise. It also explains why the information goes from one
place to another. Finally, the constraint indicates the type ofthe channel.
Sites -Situations
The Situations is normally like a label of an infobase where the facts, i.e., everything we say






These facts are called infons.Using the Situation Theory, these facts are expressed in terms of







The site there may be more than one situation, i.e., more than one infobase. We can simplify it
and think of a situation as the classification of the documents or divide the situations by the
evaluation criteria. For example:
Situation A -alI documents are classified by grades from O (zero) to 10 (ten);
Situation B -alI documents are classified by faces @/@/@ .
Situation C -all documents are classified by concepts from "A" to "E".
Situation D -all documents are classified by annotations like: "loveit" or "hateit".
Situation E -alI documents are classified by graphic bars, the longer the better.
These situations may be compound on a site or they may be divided on several sites, for
instance, one site for each rating. The facts that compound the situation are facts that indicate
how people classify the documents. Later, people define the constraints.
Filters
In modelling, we think of criteria that are going to define the filters. We are not interested in
the content of the documents; we want to know the constraints that define the filters. A change
of model also changes the filter and the constraint.
Example: In a site T, we have documents and a place to store their evaluation. Suppose the
criterion is a grade from zero to ten. We can have a constraint like "alI documents, in site T ,
which are classified better than 5 (five), goes to site x.
T X
 H::!:?]
site T filter site X
Tapestry [9] uses annotations as "likeit" and "hateit" to classify their documents. In
GroupLens [11], the classifications change depending on the implemented version: grades
from 1 (one) -worst- to 6 (six) -best-, concepts ("A" -best and "E" -worst) and graphic bars
(the longer, the better). In Firefly [13] they use grades associated with sentences that try to
capture the feeling ofthe user. The scores go from O (zero) to 7 (seven), O to 3- doesn't like, 4
-indifferent, and 5 to 7 -like it.
Time and Place
Both Barwise [5] and Devlin [7] thought of a speciallocation to put the parameters in the
infon: time and place. They are parameters in the relation to the Situation Theory that may or
not be used. In our model, we may use these special parameters to determine the date of the
document. In the parameter places. We may also register the source of a document. If the
document comes from the World Wide Web, we can store the URL (Universal Resource
Location), for example.
Polarity (O or 1 )
Polarity may be used to indicate if a document was or was not evaluated by the user. If
nobody evaluated a document, it is going to be zero, and a dummy for those objects that were
not instantiated.
Example of an infon: «R (n1,..., , l,t,); i> where R is a   + 2-uple relation, n1,...,  are
arguments, 1 is a place and t denotes time. he symbol i of the infon denotes its polarity: i is
either O or 1.
SITUA TION THEORY
Now it is important to describe Situation Theory (ST) because is not a standard theory , i.e., it
is not a Classic First-Order Theory .So it brings about several problems we will deal with in
this paper .
For someone interested only in Information/Recommender Systems the discussion below
presents no interest. It suffices for such a researcher to understand the basic LIF and ST .
He/She will agree that the formal System is simple enough and compares favorably to other
tentative formalization. But for someone that works also in Logic by itself, the discussion
below, certainly presents an important approach to the formalization presented.
In his paper [3], Barwise shows that Logic of Information Flow can be a model for several
Formal Systems, including: First-Order Theory Classic Logic, Intuitionistic Logic, Hoare's
Logic and Dretske's Logic. We do not repeat here his arguments since they can be found in
[3]. The first thing we must appoint is that following [8] we consider Situation Theory as it
was revised in [2] where he admits several different kinds of "support" predicates " F".
Consequently, the reduction of a situation to a set of infons, and the identification of a basic
infon with some entity consisting of a relation, an assignment and a polarity must be
relativized to the relevant predicate " F".
Another important issue raised by the ST is the question of well foundness of the Theory .
Considering that in [3] an infon can be substituted for another infon within an infon and the
same is true for situations, ST may incur not only in paradoxes as the well known Liar
Paradox, as well as in an indefinite descent  ,  -1' ...,ao..., i.e., it can incur in the problem ofa
not well founded theory .In fact as we see from our application of LIF and ST to our
Information Flow on the Web by using Filters, this problem does not arise since alI
parameters we use can only be replaced by primitive objects such as persons, dates, rates, etc.
will only consider a restrict ST that can be described as a distributive lattice and since this
algebra is a complete distributive lattice it is in fact a Heyting algebra.
To emphasizes the difference between ST and classical first-order logic we can note that in
the latter there is a clear mathematical notionof what a model of information associated with
sentences is, and what means one content to entail another. In classical first-order logic
contents are modelled by collections of models and a collection x entails a collection y iff x ~
y. In ST there is the need of providing a crisp model of either content or entai1ment. In
Barwise's paper, the references above the answers, show that a ST turns out to be a
distributive lattice.
To better understand ST as a set of infons it must be emphasized that there is a great
difference between an infon, as a piece of information and a proposition. Here, when we use
the term "information" it is in the sense of "possible information", i.e., whereas in the case of
a proposition it can always be true or false. In the case of infons they can be truthful or not
depending on whether there is a situation that supports it.
SET OF INFONS FORMS AN ALGEBRA
Following Barwise & Etchmendy [4] we will define an Infon Algebra I = < Sit, I, F, => >, a
non-empty collection of objects Sit (situations) and a distributive lattice < I, => > with O (the
meet of lattice) and 1 (the join of the lattice ). The lattice has the collection of objects I, infons
as its domain, and a relation F on Sit X I (Cartesian product) such that for alI s (situation)
and y, 't (infons) the following conditions hold:
(a) Ifs F y and y => 't then s F 't
(b ) s I~ 0 and s F 1
(c) If L is a finite set of infons, s F I\L if and only if s F y for each y E L
(d) IfL is a finite set ofinfons, then s F vL ifand only ifit supports some y EL
In our application, we can see the infons as set of ratings, i.e., we will now describe a sorted
algebra that applies to our case. In this algebra, we have a set of atomic objects each of a
type, and these objects include the atomic relation rating. The objects are the fo11owing:
i) a finite set of person PI' ..., Pi ( intuitively they are the researchers of a group )
ii) a finite set of documents dol, ..., doj (these include papers, videos and so on)
iii) a finite set ofratings rl, ..., rk
iv) a finite set of dates daI, ..., dai ( they mean the date ofthe documents)
v) a finite set of address al,...,  ( these can be URL'S or any other source of documents)
The atomic relation Rating forms a structured object infon ofthe form:
<Rating (Pi' doj, r k' daI, am>, i>
Where i E {1,0}, i.e., the polarity of the infon meaning a document doj was rated by the
person Pi , ifi = 1 or not ifi = 0.
We say that an infon y   't (fo11owing Barwise & Etchmendy [4] we read "  II as lIinvolves")
when the content ofy is practica11y the same as the content of't, i.e., 't does not bring any new
idea to the infon y. This implies that the rated document referred by y also includes the infon y
  't, i.e., this information is given to other elements of the group to prevent them from
reading the document referred by 't.
In this algebra 0 is the incoherent information, i.e., the same infon that has polarity 1 and 0 so
that is intuitively true that no situation can hold it. 1 is the nu11 document so that 1 is
vacuously true for any situation. 0 and 1 where include here so that (I,   ) can be defined as a
distributive lattice. In our algebra (I,   ) the notion of entai1ment (i.e., y   't) is as we said
above interpreted as the idea of the rating of a document doi implying the rating of a
document doj, since they can be considered as having the same content.
This operator   is reflexive straightforwardly, i.e.:
i) For a11 0',0'   O'.
It is transitive, i.e.:
ii) For alIO', 't and 7t, if O' => 't and 't => 7t then O' => 7t.
And it is also antisynmetric, i.e.:
iii) For alIO' and't if O' :;t: 't either O' => 't or 't => O' fails.
The algebra (I, => ) is complete since the conditions   and d above hold for a1l sets }: of
infons in our interpretation.
This algebra is clearly distributive, i.e.:
e) For a1l O', 't and 7t, O' /\ ( 't v 7t) = (O' /\ 't) v (O' /\ 7t).
Since this algebra is a complete distributive lattice, it may be ca1led a Heyting algebra.
The algebra (I, => ) in our interpretation is not a Boolean algebra since:
For a1l O' it is not true that, O' v -,O' = 1 (this can be easily seen considering that 1 in our
interpretation is the nu1l document).
To show infonna1ly the we1l foundness of our algebra, we wi1l use Aczel's definition of a
replacement system [1]. To understand the notion of a replacement system we have to
introduce the notions of a signature of an algebra and the notion of an ontology. The signature
of an algebra is simply the arity of the operator of this algebra. For instance, the signature of
the operator rating is 5 since rating is a n-upla where n = 5.
The notion of an ontology generalizes the notion of a signature. The signature defines the
fonn of a structured object of a domain of objects. Ifwe have a universe of objects, we ca1l an
ontology the forms of the objects of this universe. The forms of an ontology describe the
structures of a1l structured objects of a universe. This means that to have an ontology we must
have the fonn, i.e., the signature of a1l operators that fonn the structured objects of our
universe of objects.
Fo1lowing Aczel's paper [1] we can restrict the notion ofan ontology taking a1l possible fonns
of the objects of a universe U from a fixed class X of possible signature of objects. With this
we obtain, a form system over x. In this special case a replacement system is simply a fonn
system over a class A where the class of the fonns of the system coincide with   and an
ontology is a fom1 system over the universal class ofall objects ofthe metatheory. In our case
the objects ofthe metatheory are:
i) The atoms PI' ..., Pi; dol, ..., doj; rl, ..., rk;; daI, ..., daI; al,...,  and the atomic relation
rating .
ii) The structured objects infons.
iii) The structured objects situations that are simply sets of infons.
So that in our case an ontology must comprise the fom1s ofthese kinds of objects.
Definition of a fom1 system of a class X.
Definition 1 (A,C,.) is a fom1 system over a class X if A is a class, C is an operator such that
C: A   pow X and for each a E A, if õ : Ca   X then õ.a E A and the following holds:
1) C(õ.a) = {õ x I x E Ca}
2) õ.a = a if ax = x for alI x E Ca
3) õ .(õ.a) = (õ' o õ) .a if õ' : C (õ.a)   X
In the Definition 1 if õ : Ca   X then it can be used on the fom1 a to obtain a fom1 õ.a with
set {õx I x E Ca} ofcomponents. The fom1 õ.a should be understood to be the fom1 obtained
from a by replacing each component x of a by õx.
Using a simple example we may have the fom1:
Rating (Pi' doj ,rk, daI, am) where Pi' doj ,rk, dai,   are the parameters taking from X. In this case
X is the class p u Do u R u Da u A where
p = set ofresearchers
Do = set of documents
R = set ofratings
Da = set of dates
A = set of addresses
Then we obtain a new object from Rating (Pi' doj ,rk, daI, am) by replacing each parameter x of
the relation Rating by õx. The new form must be a form such that each parameter type must
be replaced by an object ofthe same type as the type the parameter stands for.
In the case ofthe Second order relation =:> the parameters are ofinfon type, i.e., ifwe have:
a=0'=:>'t
then Ca = { O', 't} and
õ.a = O" =:> 't' where õ.a is the new form obtained by replacing O' by O" and 't by 't'. Obviously,
in these examples, the conditions ofDefinition 1 hold.
Definition 2. (A, C, .) is a replacement system if it is a form system over A.
The objects of A can be thought either as forms for objects or as the objects themselves.
Thinking of them as the objects themselves, they are to be understood as structured entities
that have components which are themselves objects of A.
In our example we have:
AI = p u Do u R u Da u A u Rating
(those are atomic objects)
and
A2 = {=:>} u { O' 10' is an infon}
(these are the structured objects).
Finally A is:
AluA2
knowing that each infon has the form as we said above: Rating (Pi' doj ,rk, daJ, am).
when we try to generalize a signature to obtain an ontology we must be careful so that the
class ofparameters X comprises alI the objects ofour metatheory. In Aczel's paper we avoid
any dependency on X by fixing X to be a universe U that includes alI the objects of our
metatheory .From this we have the definition:
Definition 3. An ontology is a form system over the universal class U.
From the definitions above we have following Aczel's paper the definition of a well-founded
system.
Defmition 4. Let A = ( A, C, .) be a replacement system, then A is well-founded if for every
non-empty set x ç A there is a E x such that Ca is disjoint from x.
To show this informally, consider the following example, from our application:
In our case we have
AI = { P, Do, R, Da, A, Rating} i.e.
the atomic objects
A2= {=>, infons, situations}
where situations = [ x I x is an infon }
and
A=AI uA2
Suppose we have a situation s = { O", 't , 7t } and O" = Rating (Pi' doj, rk, dai, am) so that O" is our a
E A and   is our x ç A. Then:
Ca = { Pi' doj, rk, daI,  }
and since x = { O", 't , 7t} it follows that
Ca í') x = 0.
We may show by cases that in our application the Situation Theory is well founded for each
type ofobject of A. A is the universe ofmetatheoretic objects in our application.
CONCLUSION
In our paper, we use the Logic of Information Flow to model the cooperative information
filtering problem. The novelty of our approach is the use of a formal system to model this
problem where we do not have the pretension of presenting a complete formalization, i.e., a
syntax and semantic of a formal system. Instead, we use Logic ofInformation Flow to provide
a first step towards a complete formalization.
To model the cooperative information filtering problem we need to specify sites and channels.
To specify both we borrow the fundamental concepts of the Situation Theory such as it was
presented in [3] and the discussions about crucial issues that this theory arises.
As we were modelling, we noted that it was a novel application for this purpose, either for
the modelling of the user's profile -the sites, or for the modelling of the filters that explain the
information flow from one site to another -the channels and constraints.
The approach described here is in agreement with Barwise's theory .As the modelling is
independent of the type of filter or site implemented, we may particularize it, formalizing
other systems. This tool may aid many other researchers to design their own systems,
abstracting and concentrating their attention on the main problems. Although, the
formalization is not trivial, it may be a powerful and useful tool.
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